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I. Introduction 
It is apparently a commonp lace nowadays that there is no significant 
difference between natural Family Planning (NFP) and contracept ion 
through artificial means such as the pilL condoms . intrauterine devices. 
etc .; they are all methods for regulating conception. So wid tfS pread is this 
assumption that. despite consistent magisterial teaching to the contrary . 
it prevails even among Roman Catho lics. - and not just among the 
faithfuL where presumably the lack of a sophisticated moral sensibility 
precludes the perception of subt le distinctions . but even among specialists 
in moral thinking whose training would presumably equip them to 
appreciate any ethically relevant differences between the two practices. 
Indeed. the moral equiva lence of NFP and artificial contraception is so 
plain to many Catholic moralists that they do not even bother to argue for 
it; rather. it may simply be asserted . In the li ght of this prevalent opinion. 
the official teaching of the Church seems rather unenlightened . 
Numerous citations from Catholic moralists cou ld be adduced to 
document this state of affa irs. For the purposes of thi s exposition. 
however. it must suffice to consider as representative the influentia l work 
Human Sexualitr: Ne\\ ' DireClions in American Catho lic Thought by 
Anthony Kosnik et al. The representative and derivative c haracter of the 
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work on this issue is evidenced by its citation and endorsement of the 
views of famous moralists like Charles Curran and Bernard Haring 
(among others). The Kosnik book considers contraception within the 
context of family planning and asserts: "Among the methods employed 
for contraceptive purposes are: (I) complete abstinence, (2) rhythm, (3) 
the birth control pill , (4) ovulation, (5) the progesterone pill ,(6) 
intrauterine devices , (7) diaphragms, (8) condoms, (9) basal temperature , 
(10) spermicides, (II) withdrawal, (12) the DES morning-after pill, (13) 
sterilization. " I 
They are all methods of contraception, which itself is equated with 
family planning. Now the work recognizes that some moral distinctions 
need to be made between the various methods, based primarily on their 
impact upon the well-being of the persons involved , but such distinctions 
serve to dissolve rather than maintain the alleged moral difference 
between NFP and artificial birth control. Periodic continence is simply 
one form of family planning or contraception whose "natural" quality 
does not invest it with a moral superiority over "artificial" methods; to 
assert otherwise is to betray an excessively biological understanding of 
the natural law. Thus , iffamily planning can be licit (all would agree that 
this is so) , then so too are the va rious contraceptive measures which can 
pass muster according to newer personal norms (as opposed to the 
old-fashioned physiological norms of the natural law). 
In the face of this widespread moral consensus, the words of Pope John 
Paul II in Familiaris Consorlio appear strange indeed : "It [the difference 
between contraception and the use of the rhythm of the cycle] is a 
difference which is much wider and deeper than is usually thought , one 
which involves in the final analysis {WO irreconcilable concep{s 0/ {he 
human person and o/human sexuali{.1' ."2 Moreover, he goes on to assert 
that those who contracept commit an evil act which manipulates and 
degrades human sexuality, while those who legitimately regu late births 
through NFP, achieve human love at its deepest level. The strong claim 
made here, which is fully substantiated in other ' writings, directly 
contradicts the popular tendency to conflate NFP and artificial birth 
control. And like those who oppose the Church's position. the Pope also 
appeals to a personalistic norm. Is the papal position a hyperbolic 
attempt to buttress an outmoded teaching? Or is it rather the long-
awaited and much needed articulation of the profoundest meaning of the 
Church's tradition? 
The opinion of John Paul II cannot be reconciled with the opinion of 
the many. One must be true while the other must be false . Either Kosnik e{ 
al or John Paul II is correct. Therefore it will be the purpose of thi s paper 
to advance a resolution of the dispute on the basis of a careful 
philosophical analysis of the issue . The two positions shall be considered 
analytically without appeal being made to the unique character of papal 
teaching authority. 3 The first question to .be considered is whether there is 
a significant difference between artificial birth control and N FP when 
February, 1987 49 
they are considered as human actio ns. In other words, does the 
introd uction of a contraceptive device change the character of coition so 
as to ma ke it a different kind of act from intercourse which does not 
involve such an intervention? Secondly, if this is found to be the case , then 
what is the moral significance of the difference? Finally, if there is a moral 
discrepancy between the two forms of birth regulation , then what is 
implied about the corresponding perspectives on the human person and 
human sexuality? 
II. The Difference Between Contraceptive Intercourse 
and Non-contraceptive Intercourse4 
The question at issue here is the difference between sexual intercourse 
which involves the use of contraception and intercourse which does not 
involve contraception . The focus will be on the particular performance of 
the conjugal act. This insistence is necessary at the outset because the 
discussion is often muddled by the failure to distinguish between 
ind ividual acts of contraceptive intercourse and the pattern or attitude of 
the spouses as a whole. This confusion is fostered by those who would like 
to redefine contraception as a mentality or disposition marking the 
marriage as a whole. rather than something which refers primarily and 
properly to individual acts of intercourse. s Both aspects of the situation . 
the individual act and the overall att itude. are relevant to the moral 
assessment of the action. Yet these two aspects must be kept separate in 
order to understand and then evaluate the deed. It is necessary to consider 
the action first qua individual action and then qua part of an established 
pattern of action. 
What distinguishes an act of contraceptive intercourse from an act of 
non-contraceptive intercourse is that the former involves the choice to do 
something before. during. or after the act which destroys the possibility of 
conception precisely because it is believed that such a choice will indeed 
negate the possibility of conception." In other words. contraception 
involves the execut ion of a choice to exclude concepti e, n from an act 
which by nature involves that possibility. Normal sexual intercourse is an 
intrinsically generative kind of act; one contracepts because conception is 
considered to be an unacceptable possibility here and now. The choice to 
exclude conception or to contracept may manifest itself in a physical 
transformation of the act of coition into one which is intrinsically anti-
generative because of the influence of chemical or mechanical agents . It is 
more usual . however, for contraception to be accomplished by something 
which involves no physical distortion of the act (e.g. the pill). 7 This means 
that qua physical act. contraception may be an intrinsically generative 
kind of act. Yet qua intentional act . or qua act of an intelligent and 
deliberative human agent. all acts of contraceptive intercourse are anti-
generative kinds of acts . 
The key to the entire discussion . as Anscombe clearly demonstrates. is 
a proper understanding of intention: 
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The reason why people are confused about intention , and why they 
sometimes think there is no difference between contraceptive intercourse and 
the use of infertile times to avoid conception, is thi s: They don't notice the 
difference between "intention" when it means the intentionalness of the thing 
you're doing- that you're doing this on purpose- and when it means a 
further or accompany ing intention with which yo u do the thing 
Contraceptive intercourse and intercourse using infertile times may be alike 
in respect of further intention, and these further intentions may be good , 
justified , excellent But contraceptive intercourse is faulted, not on 
account of this further intention, but because of the kind of intentional action 
yo u are doing. The action is not left by you as the kind of act by which life is 
transmitted , but is purposely rendered infertile, and so changed to another 
sort of act altogether. 8 
Distinction Between Intentions 
With this distinction between the intention with which something is 
done and the further or accompanying intention (that for the sake of 
which) , it is easy to see what the precise difference is between 
contraceptive intercourse and non-contraceptive intercourse. Both may 
have the same further intention. But there is clear difference between their 
respective present intentions , the intentions inherent in the action that is 
now being performed apart from any accompanying intentions which 
mayor may not be present. The act of contraception embodies the 
intention of avoiding conception and so makes the coital act a different 
kind of act (anti-generative) from that which would result if that intention 
were not operative. Moreover, the intention embodied in the action is a 
cause or part-cause of the infertility of the act; the further circumstances 
which determine the fertility of the act (since not every intrinsically 
generative kind of act is , in fact, fertile) include the intention as a cause. 9 
Non-contraceptive intercourse reveals a different structure. It is an 
intrinsically generative kind of act both physically and intentionally. 
There may be a further intention to avoid conception (as could be the case 
in NFP), but the act itself does not embody the presenJ intention to avoid 
conception as is the case when there is interference by artificial birth 
control. The further intention to avoid conception does not cause 
infertility since the act is found to be infertile on its own . The intention to 
avoid conception is manifested in the determination to avoid intercourse 
during the woman's fertile period, but this choice does nothing to the 
sexual intercourse that is chosen during infertile periods to render it 
anti-generative. Moreover, it should be noted that the choice not to 
contracept, even when no conception is desired , reveals a fundamentally 
different attitude toward the procreative aspect of the conjugal act (which 
will be important in the moral evaluation of the act). 
Thus it is the case that contraception purposely transforms intercourse 
into a different kind of act altogether: 
In contraceptive intercourse the intentional action is deliberately altered 
from being a generative kind of action to being an act of attaining sexual 
clima x. This account of what the intentional act here is ought. I think, to be 
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accepted , whether we approve of such an act or not. For it is not a question of 
the further purpose or intention with which the act is done-to foster the 
well-being of the pa rents , sustain their love , etc .,-but of what the intentiona l 
act itself is: namely, the couple's use of one another's bodies , no longe r to 
perform a genera tive type of act. but for one or both to achieve orgasm. IO 
Let it be noted that the essential difference between contraceptive 
intercourse and non-contraceptive intercourse is located in the 
intentional structure of the act qua human act ; the issue is in no way 
determined by mere biological or physical factors. Having thus isolated 
the relevant difference as lying in the embodied intention of contraceptive 
intercourse to negate the procreative aspect of the act and so transform its 
character, it remains now to evaluate the moral significance of that 
difference. 
III. The Morality of Negating the 
Procreative Aspect of the Conjugal Act 
In order to maintain clarity offocus, it must be understood that what 
precisely is at issue here is the moral difference between contraceptive 
intercourse and non-contraceptive intercourse as they have been defined 
in the preceding analysis . What is not at issue is the legitimacy of 
intelligent family planning, which the Church recognizes and condones. 11 
For the purposes of the present analysis , the further or surrounding 
intentions will be presumed upright in both cases; that is , it is assumed 
that the issue is truly family planning and not the complete avoidance of 
conception which would be condemnable regardless of how it was 
achieved because it violates the intrinsic meaning of the marital union Y 
Nor is extra-marital intercourse at issue here, although the moral 
resolution of contraception in general will affect the evaluation of every 
act of intercourse. By eliminating these other morally relevant features of 
the action (the finis and the circumstances) from the present 
consideration, it is possible to focus squarely on the crucial question of 
the morality of intending here and now to negate the procr~ative aspect of 
the conjugal act. For if contraception is condemnable, it is so precisely 
because it embodies an intention to avoid generation which makes the 
sexual act a different kind of act regardless of any further intentions. 
The moral evaluation can be distinguished into two separate but 
related questions. The first concerns the morality of the anti-procreative 
intention embodied in the contraceptive act , while the second concerns 
the morality of the resulting new kind of action . With regard to the first 
concern, it is often argued that contraception is wrong because it 
constitutes an illicit interference into the course of nature. Yet this 
argument is inadequate insofar as it fails to make clear what makes this 
form of interference condemnable when other forms of interference (e .g .. 
medical procedures) are licit and even la udable. Anscombe's treatment of 
the issue is incomplete; she correctly identifies the question without 
dissecting it with her usual clarityU She observes' that by direc tly 
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excluding procreation , contraception deprives sexual intercourse of that 
which is universally recognized (by a "mystical perception") to be what 
makes it profoundly significant and indeed unique among all human 
activities (witness the association of sexuality with shame). The result of 
this deprivation is a trivialization and degradation of intercourse into 
something done casually for the sake of sensual gratification. Yet while 
Anscombe's intuition on this count is surely true, it is still necessary to say 
more concerning the impropriety of this kind of tampering with natural 
processes. 
Inseparable Dimensions 
This brings the discussion directly to the central issue of the 
inseparability of the unitive and procreative dimensions of sexual 
intercourse. 14 Why is this natural connection inviolable? The question 
cannot be satisfactorily settled as long as the connection is seen as a mere 
biological datum of an impersonal order of nature. According to this 
perspective , the connection stands mqnipulatable to human technology 
like other processes of nature which man masters in order to serve his own 
ends (sometimes for weal and sometimes for woe) . No, the connection 
must be seen to reflect the will of the personal Creator wherein He 
safeguards and promotes the highest values of created existence. IS 
Observation of the natural law then becomes the means to the authentic 
realization of the human person and not slavish devotion to biology. It is a 
matter of justice to the Creator not as a nominalist promulgator ofjial, but 
rather as Wisdom itself ordering all things to their proper ends. The 
assertion being made here is that, contrary to the claims of its proponents , 
contraception does not promote the true values of the human person, but 
instead degrades and contemns them. How this is so will be made clear 
during the analysis of the second question concerning the new act which 
results from a contraceptive intent. 
Yet before considering this second question , it must pe noted that there 
exists another perspective from which to evaluate the choice to contracept: 
as a direct attack upon one of the basic goods of human nature. This line of 
reasoning has been developed by Germain Grisez and others as part of a 
natural law argument against contraception. 16 The starting point for the 
argument is the recognition that among the basic goods constitutive of 
human flourishing is the good of procreation (separate from the good of 
life itself) which encompasses the total bringing into being and nurturing 
of a new human person. If this is the case , (and both reason and revelation 
testify that procreation is indeed a basic human good), then what attitude 
ought we have with regard to it? Now clearly, those who support 
contraception must take the position that it is permissible under some 
conditions to act directly against a basic human good because 
contraception has already been shown to entail an embodied intention to 
negate procreation. Therefore, those who defend contraception must 
argue according to proportionalist principles whereby one may 
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legitimately act against a basic good in order to bring about some other 
good(s); in this case the argument would be that one may assail the good of 
procreation for the sake of the unitive good. 17 Any methodology which 
allows for the direct commission of evil acts, however, is seriously defective 
philosophically and theologically. IX The proper attitude toward basic 
human goods is that articulated by Grisez: 
The good ma n need not pursue eve ry possible good - in fact. he cannot do so. 
But he must avoid direct ly violating any of the fundamental goods. Thus somc 
kinds of acts are intrinsically immoral. for somc kinds of acts ncccssaril y 
include in themselves a turning against som e basic good. an avcrsion which 
also inevitably implies an aversion from Goodness Itse lf. This sta ndard is a 
dynamic and existentia l o ne. What is required for the goodness ofa human act 
is not that it have the best possible consequences. but that it proceed from a 
trul y good will. a hea rt be nt upon all the human goods as the imagcs of 
Goodness It se lf. Such a moral standard alone befits the dignity and freedom 
of man.'· 
Therefore contraceptive intercourse is wrong because the direct violation 
of a basic human good is inco mpatible with the achievement of moral 
excellence. 
Escape from Justice 
\( is important to understand why NFP intercourse escapes the above 
judgment. The earlier intentional analysis makes this an easy task. While 
the further intentions of those who contracept and those who do not ma y 
be the same, their present intentions are quite different. The present 
intentions of those engaging in NFP do not embody the decision to act 
directly against the possibility of conception. The choice to forego 
intercourse when it is believed to be potentially procreative in nowise 
represents a repudiation of the good of procreation . One does not act 
against a good simply by not intending it here and now. Indeed. abstinence 
represents a respectful valuing of the good since it is chosen precisely 
because procreation cannot be legitimately negated. To be s~re. those who 
engage in NFP for legitimate reasons are not pursuing the good of 
procreation when they choose to have intercourse only during infertile 
periods. As Grisez notes above, however , it is not necessary to pursue all 
the human goods at once; but it is required that one not act directly against 
any of the basic goods in the course of pursui ng another good. Thus while 
NFP intercourse may be non-procreative by virtue of its further 
intentions. it is never directly anti-procreative like contraceptive 
intercourse. Therein lies perhaps the most important moral difference. 
\( remains now to consider the morality of the new sexual act brought 
into being by the intention to contracept. As was established earlier. 
contraception transforms intercourse from a generative kind of action 
(and so a true marital act) into an act of attaining sexual climax through 
the use of one another's bodies (an ersatz marital act). ]O Does this negation 
of the procreative aspect truly serve the unitive perso nal dimension of 
sexuality as the defenders of contraception claim'l Or are the two aspects of 
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cOitIOn so inextricably intertwined that to negate the procreative 
dimension is to vitiate the unitive dimension? The truth of the latter 
position has been convincingly articulated by John Paul II , especially in a 
work which he authored prior to assuming the papacy entitled Love and 
Responsibility.2 1 
The fundamental moral principle of Love and Responsibility is the 
personalistic norm: 
This norm, in its negative aspect, states that the person is the kind of good which 
does not admit of use and cannot be trea ted as an object of use and as such the 
means to an end. In its positive form the personalist ic norm confirms this: the 
person is a good toward which the on ly proper and adequate attitude is love. The 
positive content of the personalistic norm is precisely what the commandment to 
love teaches." 
Within the context of marriage as the lasting union of persons involving 
the possibility of procreation, sexual relations are evaluated according to 
this norm as the safeguard against utilitarianism (treating the person as an 
object) . The inseparability of the unitive and procreative aspects of the 
marital act is predicted upon this principle . Contraception violates the 
principle. 
The proper way for a person to deal with his or her sexuality is to 
recognize that the inner dynamism of the sexual act toward procreation is 
the indispensable condition for the realization of love between persons. 
The latter must respect the inner logic of the former in order to be 
authentic. This means that the mutual acceptance of procreation and the 
possibility of parenthood are necessary for the sexual union to be truly 
personal union: "Neither in the man nor in the woman can affirmation of 
the value of the person be divorced from awareness and willing acceptance 
that he may become a father and that she may become a mother."23 True 
personal love demands both the conscious acceptance of the other as a 
potential parent and the conscious donation of the self as a potential 
parent. 
Exclusion of Possible Parenthood 
If the possibility of parenthood is deliberately excluded from marital 
relations by contraception, then the character of the relationship changes 
radically. The transformation is from a relationship of authentic personal 
love toward a utilitarian relationship of mutual enjoyment which is 
incompatible with the personalistic norm. Instead of regarding the spouse 
as a potential co-creator in love of another person, the other becomes a 
partner in an erotic experience. In this case, the erotic urges degrade the 
relationship of love by negating the true value of persons in favor of 
mutual sensual satisfaction divorced from total reciprocal self-donation. 
By violating the natural dynamism toward procreation, which is a 
constitutive feature of the sexual act, one exploits the other by making him 
or her into something less than a person (i.e ., an object for enjoyment) . 
And by succumbing to sexual urges in this way, rather than mastering 
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them in the service of authentic persona l love , the agent acts in a less than 
personal way himself.24 
IV. The Ultimate Distinction Between Contraception and NFP 
Having established the philosophical diffe rence between contraceptive 
interco urse a nd non-contraceptive intercourse and having shown that the 
form er is intrinsically immoral because it constitutes a direct assault upon 
the procreative good which is creatively inscribed with the unitive good at 
the hea rt of human sexuality in order to promote the good of the person , 
the essay can now conclude with a consideration of the implications of 
these findings for an understanding of the human person and human 
sexuality. It should be possible now to discern the full import of the 
previously quoted words of John Paul II in Familiaris Consonio: " It is a 
diffe rence [between contraception and recourse to the rhythm of the cycle] 
which is much wider and deeper than is usuall y thought , one which 
invo lves in the final analysis two irreconcilable concepts of the human 
person and human sex uality.' 
With rega rd to the practice of contraception, the Pope notes: "When 
couples, by means of recourse to contraception, separate these two 
meanings that God the Creator has insc ribed in the being of man and 
woman and in the dynamism of their sexual communion, they act as 
'arbiters' of the divine plan and they 'manipulate' and degrade human 
sexuality and with it themselves and their married partner by altering its 
value of 'total' se lf-giving."25 The severance of the procreative and the 
unitive dimensions of the conjugal act manifests more than a dubious 
intervention into nature or even an impious dis res pect for the work of the 
Creator. Ra ther. it represents a contemning of the infinite value of the 
human perso n, through exploitation for pleasure. in the very context 
(marriage) wherein reverence and love for that va lue are meant to find 
their ultimate ex press ion. Sexual acts which deliberately negate the 
possibilit y of parenthood cannot lay claim to the description of mutua l 
self-donation: "Thus the innate language that expresses the t ~ tal reciprocal 
self-giving of husband and wife is overlaid. through contraception. by a n 
objectively contradictory language , namel y, that of not giving oneself 
totally to the other."2h 
This leads to the question of the true meaning of the "language of the 
body", a topic upon which John Pa ul II has expressed profound 
considerations. Richard Hogan summarizes so me central features of the 
Pope's thought as follows: 
56 
If the body (e ither male or female) is the expression ofa hu man person. then the 
g ift ofa man and a woma n to o ne a nother is indeed the g ift of t wo persons to o ne 
a not her. As the body is the sacrament of a pe rson. so the physical gift of a ma n 
a nd a woman is the ou tward sign. the sac rament. of a ('{IIII/ Ill/lliOIl o('pel'soll s. 
And this sacrament is a shadow o r reflec tion of the com munion of the three 
persons of the blessed Trinit y. The body. the n. is the means and the sign of the gift 
o f the man-pe rson to the female-perso n. The Ho ly Fa the r ca ll s this capacity of the 
bod y to ex press lo ve the IIlI/Jlia/llleallillg 0('1/11' hod ... " 
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Men and women are therefore called to express the language of their 
bodies in all the truth that is proper to it as the authentic revelation and 
sacrament of the human person. According to the objective truth of this 
language, the conjugal act signifies both love and potential fecundity such 
that to deprive it of the latter is also to deprive it of the former. Therefore 
the Pope concludes: 
It can be said that in the case of an artificial separation of these two aspects, there 
is carried out in the conjugal act a real bodily union , but it does not correspond to 
the interior truth and to the dignity of personal communion: communion of 
persons. This communion demands in fact that the 'language of the body' be 
expressed reciproca lly in the integral truth of its meaning. If this truth be lacking, 
one cannot speak either ofthe truth of self-mastery, or of the reciprocal gift and of 
the reciprocal acceptance of self on the part of the other person. Such a violation 
of the interior order of conjugal union. which is rooted in the very order of the 
person, constitutes the essential evil of the contraceptive act. 28 
Those who admit the licitness of contraceptive intercourse obviously 
cannot accept an anthropology which so intimately connects the spiritual 
and the corporeal within the unity of the person. In order to legitimate the 
choice to negate the procreative dimension of sexual intercourse, they 
must regard that dimension as essentially subordinate to and separate 
from the relational or unitive dimension of sexuality; the latter belongs 
intrinsically to the personal order, while the former mayor may not, 
depending upon whether it is consciously assumed and chosen by the 
subject,29 By itself, the procreative dimension belongs to the biological or 
sub-personal order (where it becomes "reproduction"). Thus the 
contraceptive position depends upon a dualist anthropology and its 
concomitant separatist view of sexuality which are objectionable on both 
philosophical and theological grounds. 3o There is also a deep irony 
involved in this position because the proponents of contraception 
normally accuse the ,Church's teaching of reflecting "physicalism": "The 
truth is that tlie advocates of contraception are guilty of physicalism, for 
they reduce the human body and the human, personal power of giving life 
to a new person to mere material instruments meant to serve consciously 
experienced goods, which for them are the 'higher' goods of human 
existence."3 I 
In contrast to the dualist anthropology and separatist understanding of 
sexuality which undergirds the contraceptive position, the foundations of 
those who promote NFP are personalist and integralist, along the lines laid 
down by John Paul II. To regulate births by reading the language of the 
body in truth is a ministration of God's plan which respects the good of the 
other by respecting the natural dynamism of the marital act toward true 
self-giving. As John Paul notes, NFP provides an entirely different context 
for the communion of persons which is marriage: 
The choice of the natural rhythms involves accepting the cycle of the person . that 
is. the woman. and thereby accepting the dialogue. reciprocal respect. shared 
responsibilit y and self-control. To accept the cycle and to enter into dialogue 
means to recogni ze both the spiritual and corporal character of conjugal 
communion and to live personal love with its requirement of fidelit y. )2 
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In order to practice NFP as this kind of communio personarum, mere 
empirical knowledge of the cycle offertility is insufficient. Rather, what is 
required is virtuous self-mastery or the "capacity to direct the sensual and 
emotive reactions [so] as to make possible the giving of self to the other 'I' 
on the grounds of mature self-possession of one's own 'I' in its corporeal 
and emotive subjectivity."33 The sexual urge must be mastered so as to 
resist any tendencies to degrade the relationship to where it expresses 
something other than personal love. NFP is based on the virtue of 
continence or marital chastity not simply because of the requirement of 
periodic abstinence, but rather because it is only by mature self-possession 
of one's psychosomatic subjectivity that the sexual union truly becomes a 
personal union. The virtue of marital chastity is not a priggish "refraining 
from", but rather a positive "capacity for" ; it does not detract from 
personal love, but rather enhances it. Personal love and chastity are 
inseparable. John Paul summarizes this beautifully as follows: 
If conjugal chastity (and chastit y in general) is manifested at first as the capacity 
to resist the concupiscence of the flesh. it later gradually reveals itself as a singular 
capacity to perceive. love and practice those meanings of the 'language of the 
bod y' which remain altogether unknown to concupiscence it se lf and which 
progressively enrich the marital dialogue of the couple. purifying it. deepening it . 
and at the same time simplifying it. Therefore. that asceticism of continence. of 
whic h the encyclical speaks (Humanae Virae. n.2I) . does not impoverish 
'affective manifestations.' but rather makes them spiritually more intense and 
therefo re enriches them H 
By now it should be plain that contraception and NFP are not two equal 
"methods" to the same end as suggested by Kosnik et al. It would be better 
to categorize them as representing two radically different approaches to 
the human person and human sexuality or as two competing "theologies of 
the body". Both style themselves as serving the authentic values of the 
human person as created in the image and likeness of God. Yet both 
cannot be true; their opposition is too great. If the preceding analysis is 
accurate, then the judgment concerning their relative meli ts should prove 
to be relatively easy. The view which recognizes the critical moral 
importance of the intentional structure of human action and the authentic 
meaning of personal love is the view which ought to compel assent. That 
such a view is the official teaching of the Roman Catholic Church is 
perhaps no accident. Yet in the final analysis , the grounds for submitting 
to it are nothing other than the grounds of truth itself. 
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